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The Canadian Role in Operation 
''Charnwood, '' 8 July 1944 
A Case Study in Tank/Infantry 
Doctrine and Practice 
David A. Wilson 
On the morning of 8 July 1944, soldiers of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) 
left their startlines near the Norman village of 
Vieux Cairon heading for Buron and Gruchy; two 
villages nearly 2,000 yards across open ground 
to the south. Their advance was part of Operation 
"Charnwood," British I Corps' final assault on 
Caen. By the end of the day most objectives were 
secured, and on 9 July Caen north of the Orne 
River and Canal was captured. General Dempsey, 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 2nd 
Army expressed his satisfaction, saying that the 
operations of 8 and 9 July were "well and cleanly 
carried out."' Troops of the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division (3 CID) and the 2nd Canadian 
Armoured Brigade (2 CAB) shared in the victory 
no less than the British divisions that took part. 
"Charnwood" stands apart from other 
Canadian operations in Normandy because it was 
the only operation of its type undertaken by 3 
CID and 2 CAB as complete formations. After 
"Charnwood" II Canadian Corps became 
operational, and the scale, tempo and 
expectations of operations altered considerably. 
The capture of Caen, therefore, affords insights 
into tactical doctrine that are obscured by later 
large-scale operations with more ambitious 
objectives. In particular, in this operation the 
Canadian armour and infantry defeated the 
Germans by employing tanks as direct-fire close-
support weapons. In fact, such intimate support 
had not been a part of Canadian tank/ infantry 
doctrine since the introduction of the Sherman 
tank in 1943. Instead, since the fall of 1943 
armoured units were told specifically to work to 
the enemy's flanks and support by fire, not by 
participating in the close infantry battle. The 
fighting on 8 July indicates that in this instance 
at least, Canadian troops won in spite of the 
prevailing doctrine and not because of it. 
Doctrine figures prominently in the 
continuing debate over the Canadian Army's 
battlefield performance in Normandy. In his 
concluding remarks on the Normandy campaign, 
C.P. Stacey clearly stated that the Germans 
achieved tactical superiority over the Allies. 2 
Stacey's conclusions have been echoed and 
amplified in more recent works. Writing in 1991, 
John A. English offered a more detailed 
explanation for the Canadians' lacklustre 
performance, listing doctrine as a partial 
explanation along with inadequate commanders, 
inferior weaponry and lack of fighting skills. 3 
David Bercusson added superb German NCOs, 
junior officers, small-unit tactics, and training 
as reasons why the fighting went on so long. 4 Jack 
Granatstein, although writing specifically of 
Canadian generalship, also noted the flaws in the 
British doctrine followed by Canada. 5 
Interest in the Normandy campaign and the 
nature of the fighting there has not abated over 
time. In recent articles, not all have been willing 
to grant the Germans total superiority on the 
battlefield. Oliver Haller clearly demonstrated 
that the 12th SS could be outfought, most notably 
in their counterattacks from 7-10 July 1944.6 
His account of the fighting carries an implicit 
message: the Canadians won because their small-
unit tactics were superior to those of the Germans 
in this particular battle. Marc Milner has recently 
added to this argument the observation that the 
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open ground the Canadians were constantly 
attacking was ideally suited to the German 
penchant for defending with fire. Milner also 
factored in the inadequate tanks, and concluded 
by reminding readers that it was the Germans 
who were ground down in Normandy.7 Set against 
Milner's analysis must be Roman Jarymowycz's 
argument that the source of tactical frustration 
was primarily doctrinal, a point of view he 
reinforced in a response to Milner. 8 
The literature to date, however, has not 
directly addressed the central core of the issue: 
the failure of Canadian tanks and infantry to 
coordinate their actions effectively on the 
battlefield. That failure may legitimately be 
attributed to the inadequate tank/infantry 
cooperation doctrine adopted from the British 
despite considerable evidence that it did not 
work. 9 This returns us to the question, just what 
was this tank/infantry doctrine, how did it 
develop, and how was it applied at the divisional 
level in Operation "Charnwood"? 
The Doctrine 
1\ ny discussion of tank/infantry doctrine must 
.rlbegin with the disclaimer that it is not the 
doctrine developed for armoured formations. 
Tanks and infantry in armoured divisions studied 
an entirely separate set of manuals with its own 
lineage. Intended for the breakout and pursuit 
phase of operations, armoured forces in 
armoured divisions focussed on coordination 
with infantry formations rather than cooperation 
with infantry units. As a rule, either "other 
formations" or the armoured division's infantry 
brigade created the breach in the enemy line 
through which the tanks were launched. 10 In 
contrast, brigades of "army tanks" - e.g., the 
Royal Tank Regiments - were specifically 
developed to support infantry divisions on the 
battlefield, primarily in the direct-fire role. 
The tank/infantry doctrine that guided 
Canadian troops in Operation "Charnwood" 
belonged - in theory - to the army tank brigade 
tradition and did not, of course, spring up 
overnight. A body of doctrinal literature existed 
that extended back as far as the First World War, 
although recent manuals reflecting wartime 
experience were of more obvious tactical value. 
These Second World War training pamphlets were 
8 
the blueprint for future battles, outlining in 
particular frontage, density, pace of advance and 
the ratio of tanks to infantry. 
In 1939 when Canadian troops began to 
study how tanks and infantry divisions worked 
together they received their information from 
British manuals. Basic to British thinking was 
the primacy of infantry who were considered the 
backbone of the attack. However, the manuals 
informed the infantry that any success depended, 
among other things, on the "aid of tanks" to break 
into a position. 11 Royal Tank Regiments 
conformed to this view of their role, holding that 
they were a "supporting weapon" whose principle 
task was "to assist the infantry to gain and hold 
the objective."12 In contrast to armoured brigades, 
the manuals specifically noted that army tanks 
were "not designed to act independently," and to 
that end they were organized in battalions 
intended for close cooperation with the infantry 
in the attack. 13 
According to doctrine in 1939, attacks 
arrived on the objective in echelons, with tanks 
moving at tank speed forming the Assault 
Echelon. More tanks, accompanied by infantry 
and moving at infantry speed followed in the 
Support Echelon. 14 Recognition of the power of 
the "modern establishment of anti-tank weapons" 
led to the principle of concentrating even army 
tanks in time and space. Thus, the 1939 
pamphlet warned against using less than one 
army tank battalion in an attack, and elsewhere 
it noted that in open country and reasonable 
visibility one such unit was able to neutralize the 
frontage which could be attacked by one infantry 
battalion. 15 Foreshadowing later actions in 
"Charnwood," the tanks were specifically warned 
against bypassing villages as long as fire from 
them was holding up the infantry. 16 For army 
tanks, close support meant close support. 
Employing tactics in these training pamphlets 
the British enjoyed initial success on the 
battlefields ofNorthAfrica. Indeed, the attacks 
on the Italian fortified camps by 7th Royal Tank 
Regiment (7 RTR) have been characterised as 
representing the tank/infantry attack in its classic 
form. 17 Actions in North Africa seemed to indicate 
that the doctrine worked and the was reflected 
in subsequent manuals. When the War Office 
issued The Employment of Army Tanks in Co-
operation with Irifantry in March 1941 much of 
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A Sherman tank of the 1st Hussars moving up in support of the irifantry, Normandy, France, 28 June 1944. 
the doctrine remained the same. Both infantry 
and army tank manuals continued to stress the 
need for a common doctrine without falling into 
routine methods. 18 The closest cooperation was 
demanded of both arms, the infantry being 
informed that an attack against organised 
resistence must be supported by army tanks, and 
that the tanks needed engineers and infantry to 
cross tank obstacles. 19 Also continued was the 
system of attacking in echelons, the tanks in the 
Assault Echelon moving at tank speed and the 
tanks in the Support Echelon moving at infantry 
speed. Unchanged was the ratio of tanks to 
infantry against organized resistance one 
battalion of tanks was to work with one battalion 
of infantry. Within that allotment, the distribution 
might be one leading squadron with each leading 
company of infantry, followed in the next echelon 
by troops working with individual platoons. 20 
Two years later in 1943, with rather limited 
battle experience, Canadian troops continued to 
follow British doctrine. By this time though the 
Canadian Army was producing manuals written 
in Canada. One such manual, from the Canadian 
Battle Drill Training Centre in Vernon, BC, 
displayed only minor differences from those of 
1941. It impressed upon infantry that army tanks 
were a necessary adjunct to success and that a 
favourable outcome depended upon the close 
cooperation between troops of tanks and 
platoons ofinfantry. 21 Battalion attacks were to 
be on a narrow two-company frontage of possibly 
600 yards. There would still be three echelons, 
with the tanks of the first echelon moving at top 
speed crushing initial resistance by velocity and 
weight of numbers. Unusually, this Canadian 
training pamphlet called for the second echelon 
tanks to also move at tank speed although the 
echelon as a whole moved at infantry speed. 22 
That this approach might present problems 
appears to have been neglected or dismissed. 
Meanwhile back in Britain, the War Office 
issued The Co-operation qf Infantry and Tanks, 
proclaiming that it superseded The Employment 
of Army Tanks in Co-operation with lf!:fantry of 
1941, and that "the doctrine here stated will be 
accepted as the basic teaching governing the 
employment of tanks and infantry in 
co-operation. "23 In this manual, for the first time 
anti-tank mines were given serious consideration. 
It was now accepted that they restricted the 
freedom of manoeuvre of tanks, a freedom which 
could only be restored by the infantry first 
clearing paths through the minefields or by the 
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use of specialized devices such as flails. 24 Attacks 
were still mounted in echelons, with no less than 
one squadron per echelon. Maintained also was 
the employment of complete army tank battalions 
for specific operations. 25 As for frontages of 
attack, the pamphlet suggested that 300 yards 
should seldom be exceeded by a tank squadron. 
From that figure, it deduced that an infantry 
division attacking with two battalions and two 
tank battalions would normally operate on a 
1,200 yard frontage. Although it cautioned that 
these figures were "purely for training purposes," 
what is important. here is the implied one-to-one 
ratio of infantry to tank units in the deliberate 
attack. 26 Taken as a whole, there was still not 
much new in this document, the primary 
exception was the increasing recognition of the 
serious problem anti-tank mines presented. 
Sooner than expected, this equation was to 
change. 
Canadian troops barely digested even these 
minor alterations to tactical doctrine when the 
Headquarters of 21 Army Group intervened. In 
July 1943, their monthly Training Letter stressed 
the limitations of tanks in the face of minefields 
and anti-tank guns. Overturning the doctrinal 
beliefs of 20 years, they now claimed that infantry 
attacks could succeed without tanks. 
Consequently, the infantry would now lead the 
attack with the tanks supporting from hull-down 
positions, where their fire was "more effective 
than close contact. "27 Advice such as this is 
reminiscent of the doctrine followed by armoured 
formations on those rare occasions when the 
tanks of the armoured brigade moved to the flank 
to support the motor battalion by fire. 28 More 
detailed instructions soon followed. 
The Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry 
Divisions in Offensive Operations, issued by 21 
Army Group in November 1943, effectively drove 
a wedge between the infantry and their supporting 
tanks. Documents such as this provide a written 
basis for English's comments on the doctrinal 
tendency of armour to hang too far back in the 
Normandy campaign. 29 Although the manual 
claimed that it was based on The Co-operation 
of Irifantry and Tanks of May 1943, that was 
t.rue only in the most limited sense.30 While Parts 
I and II were about the employment and tactical 
formations of infantry tanks cooperating with 
infantry, Part III dealt with the implications of 
using the Sherman in the army tank role. What 
10 
Part III had to say about the Sherman effectively 
negated all that had been said in the first 25 pages 
ofthe 33-page document. 
In Part I ratios and frontages were unchanged 
from previous manuals. The best results were 
obtained by concentration, with one armoured 
regiment to one battalion of infantry still in favour. 
Further, the tanks were warned against splitting 
squadrons between echelons, now renamed 
Assault, Support and Reserve. That ratio would 
be maintained even when the allotment of tanks 
to an infantry brigade might consist of only one 
regiment. In such a case it explicitly stated that 
the one regiment would be employed on the 
frontage of one infantry battalion. The only cloud 
on the horizon was a caveat against the infantry 
expecting the immediate physical presence of the 
tanks. They were informed that being in 
communication with tanks was a more vital 
factor. 31 
In Part III the cloud on the horizon became a 
downpour. There, the implications of the 
changeover to Sherman tanks were clearly 
spelled out. Thinner armour on the Sherman 
(compared to the Churchill tank usually found 
in army tank brigades) meant it was more easily 
penetrated by lieavy anti-tank guns and could not 
carry out the infantry tank role in the deliberate 
attack. Thus, the infantry were informed that 
tanks were no longer partners in the assault, but 
rather (in an unhappy phrase) the "backers up" 
to the assaulting infantry. 32 Driving home the 
message carried in Part II, it admitted that 
occasions would arise when tank squadrons 
would be allotted one to a battalion. In those 
cases, the infantry were expected to lead as one 
tank squadron was not strong enough to support 
a two-company frontage. 33 Effectively, Canadian 
infantry had not only lost their intimate tank 
support but might have to attack with fewer than 
expected tanks in support. Thus, the advent of 
minefields and the increased number and 
lethality of anti-tank weapons had separated the 
infantry from the intimate support of the tanks. 
Some infantry formations were not long in 
asking pressing questions about what "backers 
up" meant exactly. The British 49th Division 
worried that it might result in the tanks being 
too far back. 34 Twenty-First Army Group soon 
responded with another apparent shift of 
emphasis. Within two weeks of assuming 
4
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Privates Harry Parker (top) and Gus McKinnon of 
the Highland Light Infantry following the battle for 
Buron, 9 July 1944. 
command of 21 Army Group, General 
Montgomery advised the War Office that he could 
not accept the doctrine from the previous 
November. Moreover, he promised that it would 
be replaced or modified to a large extent, 
presumably before the anticipated invasion of 
France.35 
While 21 Army Group was re-writing their 
doctrine, the War Office released a new Infantry 
Training manual that addressed some of the 
battlefield problems associated with tank/ 
infantry cooperation. Issued in January 1944, 
this pamphlet contained information that 
contradicted itself. There were references to the 
importance of The Co-operation of Infantry and 
Tanks while acknowledging that cruiser tanks 
(the British term for the tanks contained in an 
armoured brigade) would be confined to 
supporting with fire in the deliberate attack.36 
Further, tank support was effectively halved; a 
tank squadron now expected to cover 600 rather 
than 300 yards. Moreover, that squadron would 
be "handled" by its commander according to the 
ground and not invariably beside the infantry.37 
The separation of tanks and infantry appears 
complete and the shape of future operations in 
Normandy more explicable. 
Before Canadian units were committed to 
battle, 21 Army Group finally weighed in with 
their last advice on the problem of tank/infantry 
cooperation. Two aspects of Notes on the 
Employment of Tanks in Support of Irifantry in 
Battle are worthy of mention. First was the return 
of tanks as the sole element of the Assault 
Echelon immediately following the engineers of 
the Gapping Force. 38 Second was the inclusion 
of other arms of service further forward in the 
attacking force. 39 This short and idealized booklet 
gave a precise view of the defences likely to be 
found, mentioning minefields, wire, anti-tank 
ditches, section posts, crawl trenches, anti-
personnel mines and booby traps. 40 Despite its 
attention to detail it contributed little to providing 
instruction in tank/ infantry cooperation, and by 
differing from concurrent doctrine may have 
added to the doctrinal confusion. 
Having mentioned above the types of defences 
to be encountered it may be helpful to add more 
detail, for the attacks in Operation "Charnwood" 
faced almost the classic form of German 
defences. The War Office pamphlet on that topic 
informed that the German intention was to 
"destroy the enemy by fire."41 Ground was chosen 
according to its suitability for such purposes, and 
the fortified ring of villages north of Caen fit that 
description well. Mines and wire certainly existed 
but they took second place to what the pamphlet 
called the "co-ordination of fire of high- and low-
11 
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Canadian irifantry advancing near Gruchy, France, 9 July 1944. 
trajectory weapons," that is mortars and machine 
guns.42 The theoretical employment of German 
armoured troops in defence also corresponded 
to the situation north of Caen. Their defences 
were usually built around anti-tank guns acting 
as a cover for the divisional artillery, with the 
tanks kept as mobile reserve. 43 This arrangement 
looks very much like the tactical situation of 8 
July 1944. It was also noted that given several 
weeks the Germans would systematically 
construct continuous trenches and permanent 
dugouts, and they had certainly been allowed that 
time in Normandy.44 
A summing up of tank/infantry doctrine to 
this point in the war reveals elements of both 
continuity and change. Frontage of attack and 
pace of advance had remained constant 
throughout as they were keyed to infantry tactics. 
The ideal ratio of combat arms was maintained 
at one tank regiment to one infantry battalion 
despite circumstances when this rule could be 
broken. In 1944, defensive elements such as anti-
tank mines and anti-tank guns brought more 
integration of other supporting arms and the 
relegation of tanks to further back in the attack. 
From leading the assault they were now found 
supporting with fire from the flank or rear. It 
remained to be seen whether this arrangement 
was workable under battle conditions. 
12 
The Operation 
A!Jeration "Charnwood" began on 8 July 1944, 
V~hen the British I Corps, strongly reinforced 
to a strength of 115,000 personnel, opened its 
drive to clear Caen as far as the Orne River. 45 
Three infantry divisions were to attack on an 
eight-mile front, the 3rd Canadian on the right, 
the 59th British in the centre and the 3rd British 
on the left. 46 The infantry were supported by the 
fire of656 guns ofvarious calibres, 350 tanks in 
two armoured brigades plus specialized armour 
such as flails, flame-throwers and AVREsY Some 
of the artillery had begun firing a series of 
concentrations at 2300 hours the night before, 
targeting some 15 German-held villages around 
Caen.48 
As an operation, "Charnwood" was cast in 
the mould of the British way of warfare in the 
mid-twentieth century. Limited in its aims, this 
was a "set-piece" battle, the kind the British had 
been fighting for two years. Thus, its ultimate 
objectives were in the range of 4,000 yards; to 
be accomplished in four phases each with their 
own objectives. In Phase I the two British 
divisions would capture Galmanche, la Bijude 
and Lebisey Wood. Once these objectives were 
achieved, all three divisions would continue the 
advance in Phase II. This would see the 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss3/2
Canadians capture Buron, Gruchy, the Chateau 
St. Louet and Authie while the 59th Division 
pushed south on their left flank, moving through 
St. Contest and Epron. Phase III called for the 
Canadians to capture Cussy and the Abbey 
d'Ardenne, pushing the Germans back to the line 
Franqueville-Ardenne. In Phase IV, all formations 
would exploit to the final objectives. 49 
The villages attacked by I Corps were on the 
last high ground before Caen, including some of 
the highest ground between that town and the 
coast. Once the Germans gave them up they 
would have to move back to the high ground to 
the south of Caen. That alone might have dictated 
defending the ground they presently held, but in 
any case, Hitler had forbidden withdrawal. To 
defend this critical ground the Germans could 
spare but two divisions in the front line, 16th 
Luftwaffe Field Division on the right and the 12th 
SS Panzer Division on the left. The former, with 
aid of a tank battalion from 21st Panzer Division, 
held the line from the Canal de Caen west to the 
railway near Cambes. From that point, the 12th 
SS continued the line through Galmanche, 
Buron, Gruchy and then south to Carpiquet 
airfield and finally crossing the Odon near 
Verson. 50 According to Kurt Meyer, commanding 
the 12th SS, there were "eleven dazed battalions" 
defending this ground the Allies wanted so much, 
a serious imbalance of forces by any measure.s' 
To lessen the odds. the Germans had made their 
usual clever use of ground, creating in the words 
of the British Official History, "mutually 
supporting positions based on what were by now 
virtually tank-proof villages." Ellis listed the 
villages of Lebisey, Galmanche, Gruchy, 
Franqueville, Cussy and Couvre-Chef as 
belonging in this category; four of these six were 
to be taken by the Canadians. 52 
The Canadian Attacks 
Canadian troops began to move at 0730 hours on 8 July, an hour after General Crocker, 
GOC of I Corps, ordered Phase II to commence. 
Objectives for 3 CID in this phase included the 
villages of Gruchy and Buran, while on their left 
the 59th Division attacked St. Contest, Malon and 
Epron. 53 On their assigned four-mile frontage 
Canadian planners made their dispositions as 
best as its convex shape allowed. That shape 
seemed to preclude attacking with two brigades 
in line. A second complication was the inter-
divisional boundary with 59th Division that 
narrowed around Cussy before widening again 
closer to Caen. 
Operating under these constraints, 3 CID 
decided on a plan that entailed 9th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) capturing Buran, Gruchy 
and Authie, with later exploitation to Chateau St. 
Louet and Franqueville. Once 9 CIB had secured 
Authie, Major-General Keller would swing his axis 
of advance 90 degrees, 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade (7 CIB) attacking southwest toward 
Cussy and Ardenne. Only in the exploitation of 
Phase IV would 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
(8 CIB) join in the advance. 
To support the infantry, 3 CID assigned the 
three armoured regiments of 2 CAB to the three 
infantry brigades: the Sherbrooke Fusiliers 
Regiment (SFR) to 9 CIB, the 1st Hussars to 7 
CIB and the Fort Garry Horse (FGH) to 8 CIB. At 
brigade level this process continued, with 
individual squadrons placed in support of 
infantry battalions. Even 8 CIB, though not 
participating in the initial phases, followed this 
form, allocating its armour to individual 
battalions. 54 This arrangement, while providing 
good direct support, was too weak and too 
dispersed according to earlier doctrine. 
On the frontage that 3 CID would be attacking 
Kurt Meyer had placed his 25th SS Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, reinforced by elements of 
the divisional tanks and artillery. Although Meyer 
had referred above to 11 defending battalions. 
that figure reflected the total of combat units 
within the division as a whole. Hubert Meyer, 
principal staff officer of the 12th SS, spoke more 
realistically of"four punch-drunk battalions" as 
holding the line. 55 He was obviously referring to 
the three infantry battalions of the 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment and the single battalion from 
the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Rifle 
companies of the regiments (supported by the 
mortars and machine guns of the machine gun 
companies) were deployed along the front, 
occupying some villages and in front of others. 
Meyer had 60 tanks operational, most held in 
reserve or in ambush positions. Despite being a 
naturally strong position to defend by fire it 
lacked depth. As Michael Reynolds has noted, it 
was certainly not the "classic" defensive position 
of the manuals with Battle Outposts, Advance 
13 
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Carpiquet 
and Main Positions.56 In the sector attacked by 
the Canadians it was no secret where the 
Germans were. Defence overlays prepared for 
"Charnwood" more or less accurately plotted the 
location of troops, trenches, suspected minefields 
and support weapons. 57 The weight of the initial 
attack by 9 CIB would fall primarily upon the 
3rd Battalion of the 25th with its three rifle 
companies, mortars and machine guns. 
14 
Operation "Charnwood" 
8 July 1944 
- Phasell 
•••••• Phase Ill 
-- Brigade boundary 
Divisional boundary 
German positions 
Scale: 1 em = 250 m 
(approximate) 
Once assigned his brigade objectives, 
Brigadier Cunningham of 9 CIB decided on a plan 
that involved attacking two battalions up. On the 
left, the Highland Light Infantry (HLI) supported 
by "A" Squadron of the Sherbrookes would 
assault Buran, while on the right the Stormont, 
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDG), 
backed by "B" Squadron of the Sherbrookes, 
would capture Gruchy. Once Buran was secured, 
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNS) would 
mount their attack on Authie and the SDGs move 
8
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on to capture Chateau St. Louet. Failure to 
capture Buron quickly would impose subsequent 
delays on both brigade and divisional plans. 
When the HLI moved from their startline 
around Vieux Cairon they attacked with two 
companies up, "D" on the right and "B" on the 
left. Supporting them, the tanks of "A" Squadron 
moved tactically with two troops up and two 
back: No.1 Troop supporting "D" Company, No.2 
Troop with "B" Company, and No.4 and HQ 
Troop following in the rear. 58 As the Canadian 
infantry and armour approached Buran they 
came under machine gun and mortar fire just 
before 0800 hours. On the right, No.1 Troop 
quickly lost three of its four tanks to mines and 
88 mm anti-tank guns firing from the southwest 
and had to be replaced by No.4 Troop. On the 
left the situation was initially more favourable, 
but there too Panzerfausts and 88s soon 
accounted for all of No.2 Troop. These casualties 
occurred while the tanks were supporting from 
the flank, according to current doctrine. 
Squadron Headquarters then moved up to 
support "B" Company of the HLI, but fear of yet 
more minefields kept them from supporting the 
infantry closely enough to clear the enemy from 
their trenches. It took considerable time for the 
HLI to contact the tanks. The first message was 
passed at 0801 hours but at 0940 hours the 
infantry were still telling Brigade that there were 
no minefields northwest of Buron. 59 Finally, 
Lieutenant Campbell of the HLI made several 
trips out to the tanks to inform them that the left 
flank approaches to Buran were clear of mines. 
Once the tanks were convinced that this was the 
case they proceeded to assist "B" Company in 
cleaning out the enemy machine gun posts one 
by one. 60 This was very definitely intimate 
support, the sort that the Sherman tank could 
not provide. 
Having cleared out the German infantry the 
tanks moved to the high ground southeast of the 
village, but their day was far from over. Joined 
by two troops of British 17 -pounder M -10 tank 
destroyers from 62nd Anti-Tank Regiment, "A" 
Squadron now fought a defensive battle against 
counterattacking Panthers.Together they defeated 
the German tanks, the M-10s claiming 13 tanks 
at a cost of six of their own. 61 "A" Squadron began 
this battle at half strength and by the end of the 
day was reduced to four vehicles. However, the 
infantry fighting in Buron continued until 1430 
hours and the SFR did not report consolidating 
on the high ground southeast of Buran until1512 
hours. 62 
In their attack on Gruchy the SDGs also 
moved tactically two up, "B" Company on the 
right supported by No.2 Troop, and "A" Company 
on the left supported by No.1 Troop.63 With the 
remaining tank troops grouped on the left flank, 
the intention had been to support by fire from a 
position 600 yards south of Vieux Cairon. 
Accounts vary slightly but it appears that the 
SDGs came under heavy mortar fire at 0745 
hours and machine gun fire by 0754 hours. From 
that point the attack progressed rapidly. At 0805 
hours the SDGs reported that the supporting 
tanks were going into Gruchy, by 0812 hours the 
enemy were observed leaving the far end of the 
village and by 0830 hours the tanks were 
mopping up between Buron and Gruchy. 64 Once 
again, success came from the intimate support 
of the tanks. 
It was only after this tactical success that "B" 
Squadron's casualties mounted. The enemy 
infantry disposed of, Nos.1 and 2 Troops moved 
south of the village while No.3 and HQ Troops 
moved north. The southern pair of troops came 
under fire from German tanks and anti-tank 
weapons firing from the Chateau St. Louet, losing 
several vehicles. North of Gruchy the remaining 
troops encountered "very stiff resistance" from 
German infantry, and there too long-range anti-
tank fire accounted for all of No 3 Troop. 
By 0950 hours the SDGs reported they were 
ready to take Chateau St. Louet, and five minutes 
later General Keller ordered Brigadier 
Cunningham to do so. 65 However, "C" Company 
did not close up to the Chateau until1445 hours 
and accompanied by the armour went into it at 
1510 hours. This time squares with the SFR 
account that reported all three squadrons were 
employed in putting the infantry into the Chateau 
at 1515 hours.66 
The varying fortunes of the two infantry 
battalions reflected a tactical anomaly that could 
not have been anticipated. The 1Oth Company of 
25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was in position 
forward of Buron but its 11th Company between 
Buran and Galmanche had already been attacked 
by the British 59th Division in Phase I. In 
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Above: An example of Gennan defensive positions around the town of Galmanche, typical of those encountered 
during Operation "Charnwood." Galmanche was one of the main obstacles in the path of the British 59th 
Division (attacking just to the east of the Canadians) during Operation "Charnwood." This groundcheck, 
compiled three days before the start of "Charnwood" by the Aerial Photography Interpretation Sections 
(APIS) of 59 Division and 2nd Anny, is based on details obtained from interpretation of the aerial photo and 
intelligence gathered from patrols and the capture of prisoners.. The photograph was taken by an aircraft 
from 39 Wing, Royal Canadian Air Force. 
Left: A composite air photo of the Charnwood battlefield (Phase II objectives). 
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Sherman tank advancing through Buran, France, 9 July 1944. 
retrospect, it appears that this company, faced 
with a breakthrough by British tanks and 
infantry, retreated towards lOth Company. The 
identical situation obtained between Gruchy and 
Buran where the 9th Company, attacked by the 
SDGs and "B" Squadron, moved toward battalion 
headquarters. In effect, this concentrated the 
whole of the 3rd Battalion in Buran supported 
by its own mortars and machine guns plus tanks 
and artillery from divisional assets. While not 
actually outnumbering their attackers in the 
Highland Light Infantry, the Germans were 
considerably better off with regard to supporting 
weapons. This situation at Buran occurred in a 
position believed at the time to be the key 
controlling other objectives and thus the most 
heavily defended. 67 Thus, despite all the 
resources at the disposal of I Corps, at the sharp 
end a single battalion of infantry supported by a 
single squadron of tanks was attacking another 
battalion defending from prepared positions. A 
careful reading of the doctrinal manuals indicates 
that this weak and dispersed assault was 
definitely not "by the book." Little wonder that 
the battle lasted all day in the ruins of Buran. 
18 
Like the SDGs, the North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders had their plans upset by the 
continuing fighting in Buran. Their Forming Up 
Place (FUP) was supposed to be in Buran from 
where they would advance southeast towards 
Authie. "D" Company would attack frontally as 
Fire Company supported by "A" on the left flank 
and "B" on the right. Once they secured Authie, 
"C" Company was tasked with the exploitation 
to Franqueville. 68 The NNS reported they were at 
their FUP at 1045 hours, but they had already 
received fire from St. Contest in getting there and 
worse was to follow. There were still Germans in 
trenches at the far side of Buran and their fire 
pinned down "D" Company. "B" Company 
discovered the same tactical situation on the west 
side of Buran. There were still Germans in the 
orchard on Buran's southern limits that had to 
be cleared out by infantry and tanks before the 
battalion could move on. Consequently, it was a 
"badly battered battalion" that jumped off at 1515 
hours. 69 Fortunately, the NNS found no Germans 
in the first houses in Authie and the regiment 
reported the village captured by 1530 hours. 
Buoyed by this relatively swift victory and 
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supported by the remnants of "A" and "C" 
Squadrons of the Sherbrookes, "C" Company 
advanced towards Franqueville, reaching it by 
1600 hours. 70 
While 9 CIB's attacks were clearing Buron, 
Gruchy and Authie, 7 CIB was moving forward. 
At 1000 hours they were in position northeast of 
Vieux Cairon, at 1245 hours they had moved to 
a position between Buran and Gruchy, and by 
1800 hours they were at their startlines southeast 
of Authie. From their startlines on the Buron-
Authie road, the Regina Rifles supported by "A" 
Squadron of the 1st Hussars would attack on 
the right, first capturing the gun site at the point 
where two tracks converged northwest of the 
Abbey d'Ardenne and then the Abbey itself. 
Simultaneously, the Ca..11.adian Scottish supported 
by "C" Squadron of the Hussars, and keeping to 
the north of the Authie-Cussy road, were to 
capture defensive works several hundred yards 
northwest of Cussy and then the village. 71 Having 
suffered substantial casualties in Operation 
"Windsor," the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (RWR) with 
"B" Squadron of the Hussars in support were in 
reserve for this phase of operations. 
The Canadian Scottish, supported by "C" 
Squadron of the 1st Hussars, attacked with "A" 
Company on the right and "C" Company on the 
left, advancing in extended line for their "walk" 
to Cussy.72 They too had their difficulties, being 
shelled while moving to their assembly area near 
Gruchy and then receiving fire from Buron. 
Consequently, H-Hour was set back to 1740 
hours. 73 "A" Company was tasked with reducing 
the strongpoint 300 yards short of Cussy while 
"B" and "C" took Cussy itself in a pincer 
movement. Soon after they began to advance an 
"unforeseen eventuality" complicated matters -
both flanks were open. On their left, the British 
59th Division had not taken Bitot, and the Abbey 
had not yet fallen to the Reginas. By 2000 hours 
they reported to Brigade that tanks were on "both 
sides of us. "74 In response, "B" and "D" 
Companies and the anti-tank section of the Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles were sent forward. One company 
proceeded to Cussy filling the gap between "B" 
and "C" Companies of the Regina Rifles with the 
other held in reserve. 75 Meanwhile, a German 
counterattack failed, losing six tanks to the 
supporting armour and prompting the CSR War 
Diary to refer to the "excellent service" performed 
by Canadian tanks. 76 By 2300 hours Cussy was 
firmly in Canadian hands. 77 
The Regina Rifles encountered many of the 
same difficulties as the CSR in reaching their 
startline, their attack being delayed until1800 
hours. Their plan was for "B" Company to first 
capture the small mounds 400 yards east of 
Authie, after which "C" and "D" Companies would 
pass through to capture the Abbey. 78 German 
anti-tank gun fire destroyed the majority of their 
supporting tanks, however, and when the attack 
went in it was without tanks or artillery. As a 
consequence, at 2100 hours they were just over 
halfway to the Abbey and tenacious German 
resistance caused heavy casualties in "B" and "C" 
Companies.79 Nightfall found the Abbey still in 
German hands; the Canadian attacks were 
finished for the day. 80 
Conclusion 
S o how did "Charnwood" compare to the infantry/tank doctrine that the Canadians 
had studied? In certain fundamentals, the battles 
north of Caen were very similar to those 
described in the training pamphlets. The 
frontages assigned to the infantry battalions and 
companies were close to those they had practised 
and the pace of advance equally so. Also expected 
was the physical separation of the tanks and 
infantry that had followed from the introduction 
of the Sherman in 1943. 
However, there were two areas where the 
battle varied from accepted doctrine. The first 
was the diminished level of tank support. Thus 
far in the war the ideal had usually been 
maintained at one tank regiment to one infantry 
battalion. Despite occasional references in the 
manuals to individual squadrons supporting 
infantry battalions this level of armoured support 
invariably contained mitigating circumstances. 
In "Charnwood" the level of tank support was 
reduced without any compensatory factors, and 
the fighting clearly shows that earlier cautions 
about the tank squadron being too weak to 
support a two-company attack were well-
founded. 
In the attacks on both Buran and Gruchy the 
supporting tank squadrons were swiftly reduced 
in numbers with some troops being eliminated 
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entirely. Simply put, there were not enough tanks 
operating on the frontages of the two infantry 
battalions. By the end of the day all units of 2 
CAB had seen action, suggesting that it might 
have made better sense to use an armoured 
regiment with each battalion attack in 9 CIB, 
including that of the NNS. This advice is tendered 
with the knowledge that the final objectives of 
the operation were limited to roughly 4,000 yards 
regardless of the success enjoyed on 8 July 1944. 
Saving a reserve of tanks made good sense if the 
advance was to continue immediately, or a major 
counterattack was expected. As to the first, this 
was simply not part of the plan. Once 
"Charnwood" succeeded 21 Army Group 
intended to mount another operation to clear 
Caen south of the river. Regarding the second 
possibility, local counterattacks could logically 
be expected, but larger operations could not be 
contemplated by the Germans in the face of 
ULTRA intelligence and the massive air and 
artillery superiority. In fact, employing the whole 
of 2 CAB might well have reduced the tank 
casualties of the units involved by swamping the 
German defenders. 
The second departure from doctrine was the 
way tanks provided close support to the infantry. 
Analysis ofthe fighting reveals that the doctrinal 
tendency of the armour to hang back was not a 
viable technique. Any successes that the 
Canadians enjoyed on 8 July 1944 followed from 
the intimate support of their accompanying 
tanks, not from tanks firing from the flank or 
rear. Buron was cleared of its German defenders 
only when the tanks used their machine guns at 
close range just as infantry tanks had formerly 
done. Contrary to what The Co-operation of 
Tanks with Irifantry Divisions in Offensive 
Operations had claimed, the tanks were 
"partners in the assault." 
Fresh battlefield evidence existed that 
employing the Sherman tank as a direct-fire 
close-support weapon was viable. On 6 June 
1944 Canadian tanks had performed in that role, 
a role that was planned for from the start. In 
General Keller's opinion, the overwhelming 
success of the seaborne assault, with less than 
half the expected casualties, was largely explained 
by the presence of the tanks. 81 Canadian 
commanders ignored this evidence in the post-
assault period to the detriment of operations. 
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